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Abstract: 
 
This paper introduces a new game theoretic equilibrium, Bayesian equilibrium by 
iterative conjectures (BEIC). It requires agents to make predictions, starting from first 
order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep 
updating with statistical decision theoretic and game theoretic reasoning until a 
convergence of conjectures is achieved. In a BEIC, rationality is achieved for 
strategies and conjectures. The BEIC approach is capable of analyzing a larger set of 
games than current Nash Equilibrium based games theory, including games with 
inaccurate observations, games with unstable equilibrium and games with double or 
multiple sided incomplete information games.  On the other hand, for the set of 
games analyzed by the current games theory, it generates far lesser equilibriums and 
normally generates only a unique equilibrium. It also resolves inconsistencies in 
equilibrium results by different solution concepts in current games theory. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Current Nash Equilibrium based games theory solves a game by asking which 
combinations of strategies constitute equilibriums. The implicit assumption is that 
agents know the strategies adopted by the other agents and which equilibrium they are 
in, for otherwise they will not be able to react specifically to the optimal strategies of 
other agents but must react to the strategies of the other agents they predicted.1 This 
implicit assumption reduces the uncertainty facing the agents and simplifies 
computation. Further refinements such as sub-game perfect equilibrium, Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian (Nash) equilibrium, though adding further 
requirements, do not change this implicit assumption.2 
 
The Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures approach, in contrast, solves a 
game by assuming that the agents do not know the strategies adopted by other agents 
and have no idea which equilibrium they are in. Therefore, to select a strategy, they 
need to form predictions or conjectures about the strategies adopted by other agents 
and the equilibrium they will be in and conjectures about such conjectures, ad 
infinitum. They do so by starting with first order uninformative predictive probability 
distribution functions (or conjectures) on the strategy of the other agents. The agents 
then keep updating their conjectures with game theoretic and statistical decision 
theoretic reasoning until a convergence of conjectures is achieved. In a BEIC, the 
convergent conjecture is consistent with the equilibrium it supported. BEIC therefore 
rules out equilibriums that are based on conjectures that are inconsistent with the 
equilibriums they supported as well as equilibriums supported by convergent 
conjectures that do not start with first order uninformative conjectures. 
 
What is the rationale to start with first order uninformative conjectures? Other than 
the assumption that the agents have no idea about the strategies adopted by other 
agents and the equilibrium they are in, there is the motive to let the game solves itself 
and selects its own equilibrium strategies and conjectures. The equilibrium so 
achieved therefore is not imposed or affected by informative conjectures arbitrarily 
chosen, but by the underlying structure and elements of the game, including the 
payoffs of the agents and the information they have.  
 
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) propose a tracing procedure to select the most compelling 
equilibrium among multiple Nash equilibriums.3 Their tracing procedure starts with 
first order uninformative conjectures too. The solution of simultaneous games by 
Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC) is very similar to the tracing 
procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). However, the BEIC approach does not start 
its tracing with only Nash equilibriums. It starts with all possible strategies of the 
players. This is ensured through the enforced use of first order uninformative 
                                                 
1 Refer to Nash (1950, 1951). 
2 Refer to Harsanyi (1967, 1968a, 1968b). 
3 See also Harsanyi (1995). 
conjectures.  
  
Section 2 presents the BEIC solution of sequential games with incomplete 
information and inaccurate observation and serves to introduce the general thrust of 
the new equilibrium concept. Section 3 presents the BEIC approach to sequential 
games of incomplete but perfect information. Section 4 presents the BEIC approach to 
simultaneous games. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
  
2. Sequential Games with Incomplete Information and Inaccurate Observation. 
  
In present modeling of incomplete information games, there is either perfect or 
imperfect information. That is to say, either the action of the first mover is accurately 
observed by the later movers or it is not observed at all. For instance in a signaling 
game, the action of the first moving player whose type is unknown is accurately 
observed by the other players. After observing the action of the player with unknown 
type, the other players use game theoretic reasoning and the Bayes rule to update their 
prior beliefs about the type of the player with unknown type. They then choose their 
optimal strategy given their posterior beliefs about the type of the player with 
unknown type. The equilibrium so obtained is termed the perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium. On the other hand, in an incomplete and imperfect information game, the 
action of the player whose type is unknown is not observed by the other players at all. 
The other players choose their optimal strategy given their prior beliefs about the type 
of the player with unknown type. The equilibrium so obtained is termed Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium.  
 
The assumption that the action of the first mover is either accurately observed or not 
observed at all is too restrictive. Given this assumption, there is no statistical 
inference and decision involved concerning the action of the first mover whose type is 
unknown. This is despite of the fact that Bayes rule is used to update the belief on the 
probability of type of the player with unknown type. 
 
Sequential games with incomplete information and inaccurate observation generalizes 
the current sequential games framework in which there is either perfect information or 
imperfect information. Here the other player observes inaccurately the action of the 
player with unknown type. Inaccurate observation means that the other player 
observes the action of the player with unknown type with a noise term and there is a 
positive probability that they will make observational error due to the noise term.  
 
In a sequential game with incomplete information and inaccurate observation, the 
second mover must make statistical inference on the action of the first mover player 
with unknown type. He does so bases upon two sources of information. One source of 
information is the inaccurate observations on the action of the player with unknown 
type. This is the sample data. The other source of information is the evidence which 
concerns the motive of the player with unknown type constructed through game 
theoretic reasoning, basing upon knowledge such as the prior distribution function on 
the type of the player with unknown type and the structure of the game. The 
information so constructed gives a belief about the probability of possible actions 
taken by the player with unknown type. This belief is the prior predictive distribution 
function or conjecture on the action of the player with unknown type. 
  
Given the need for statistical inference and decision, the player has to decide which 
statistical decision rule to use. Since in games theory, the basic assumption is that the 
player is rational, that is, he optimizes, the decision rule has to be a Bayes rule. A 
decision rule is a Bayes rule if it attains the infimum of the expected loss function or 
the supremum of the expected utility function.4 Furthermore, given the knowledge a 
player has about the game, he will form prior predictive distribution function on the 
possible actions of the other player. There are many ways to construct a prior 
distribution function. Therefore, in an incomplete information game with inaccurate 
observation, there could be a lot of equilibriums given that there are many statistical 
decision rules and many different prior beliefs. Presently in games theory there is no 
equilibrium concept to solve such games.  
 
This section uses the concept of Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures to solve 
such games. The conjecture is formed through iterative reasoning, starting with a first 
order uninformative conjecture or prior predictive distribution function on the action 
of the player with unknown type and keeps being updated by game theoretic and 
statistical decision theoretic reasoning until a convergence of the prior predictive 
distribution function is achieved. Consequently, the convergent conjecture 
incorporates all available useful information such as the structure of strategic 
interaction and the prior distribution function on the type of the player with unknown 
type.  
 
2.1. Example 1: Market Leadership 
  
                                                 
4 Other criteria for selecting decision rule include the minimax rule and admissibility. Refer to Berger 
(1980). 
There are two players: Firm 1, the market leader and Firm 2, the market follower. 
Firm 1 moves first by setting its output level. Firm 2 observes inaccurately the output 
level of Firm 1 due to a confounding noise term. Firm 2 forms iterative conjectures on 
the output level of Firm 1 starting with a first order uninformative prior predictive 
distribution function and keeps updating by statistical decision theoretic and game 
theoretic reasoning until a convergence of conjectures is achieved and then sets its 
output level. 
  
The structure of the game is common knowledge. The cost efficiency of Firm 1 which 
determines the type of Firm 1 is chosen by Nature from a predetermined distribution 
function which is common knowledge. Once chosen, the type of Firm 1 is private 
knowledge. The type of Firm 2 is common knowledge. Firm 2 therefore must makes 
inference on both the type and action of Firm 1. The distribution function of the noise 
term that confounds the observation by the Firm 2 on the actual output level of Firm 1 
is common knowledge. 
  
The Model 
  
1q , the output level of Firm 1, is the action of Firm 1. 2q , the output level of Firm 2, 
is the action of Firm 2. Total level of output in the market is 1 2Q q q= + . The inverse 
demand function is P D Q= − . The payoff function of Firm 1 
is ( )1 1 2 1 1D q q c qπ = − − − . 1c  is the average and marginal cost of production of Firm 
1. 1c  decides the type of Firm 1. Firm 1 knows 1c  but Firm 2 does not know 1c . 
1c has a normal distribution which is common knowledge: 1 1~ ,c N c ζ
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . The action 
of Firm 1 is inaccurately observed by Firm 2 with a noise term: 1R q ε= + . ε  is the 
noise term. ε  has a normal distribution: ( )~ 0,Nε κ . The above leads to the 
following sampling distribution on R : ( )1 1~ ,R q N q κ and the likelihood function: 
( )1 ~ ,q R N R κ . 
  
The game is solved starting with an uninformative first order prior conjecture on 1q . 
That is, firm 2 solves  
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 1 2 2 2 1 1maxq E D q q c q f q R dqπ
∞
−∞
= − − −∫        1 
where ( )1f q R  in equation 1 is the posterior distribution function with an 
uninformative prior distribution function. The optimal solution is 22 2
D R cq − −= . 
 
Firm 1, being the first mover, anticipates the stochastic response of firm 2 and solves  
( ) ( )
1
2
1 1 1 1max 2q
D R cE D q c q f dπ ε ε
∞
−∞
− −⎛ ⎞
= − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫       2 
The optimal solution is 2 11
2
2
D c cq + −= . Therefore, the second order prior conjecture 
is 1 1~ ,q N q ζ
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  with
2 1
1
2
2
D c cq
−
− + −
= . The second order posterior conjecture 
is
^ ^
1 1~ ,q R N q ρ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , with ( )
^
1 1 11q R q R q
ζ κ θ θ
κ ζ κ ζ
− −
= + = + −
+ +
 where ζθ
κ ζ= +  
and 
^ ζκρ
κ ρ
=
+
.  
 
Given the second order conjectures, firm 2 solves  
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 1 2 2 2 1 1maxq E D q q c q f q R dqπ
∞
−∞
= − − −∫        3 
where ( )1f q R in equation 3 is the second order posterior conjecture or distribution 
function and the optimal solution is 
^
1 2
2 2
D q cq − −=  
and
( ) 22 1 1
2 1
1
~ ,
2 4
D c q q
q q N
θ θ θ
κ
−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
− − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
 
Anticipating that Firm 1 solves  
( ) ( )
1
^
2 1
1 1 1 1max 2 2q
qD cE D q c q f dπ ε ε
∞
−∞
⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟= − − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫       4 
The optimal solution is ( )( )
2 11
1
1 2
2 2
D c q c
q
θ
θ
−
+ + − −
=
−
. Therefore, the third order prior 
conjecture is 1 1~ ,q N q ρ
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , 
2 1
1
2
3
D c cq
θ
−
− + −
=
−
 and ( )2
1
2
ρ ζ
θ
=
−
. The third order 
posterior conjecture is
^ ^
1 1~ ,q R N q ρ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , ( )
^
1 1 11q R q R q
ρ κ θ θ
κ ρ κ ρ
− −
= + = + −
+ +
, 
ρθ
κ ρ
=
+
 and 
^ ρκρ
κ ρ
=
+
. 
 
Given the third order conjectures, firm 2 solves 
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 1 2 2 2 1 1maxq E D q q c q f q R dqπ
∞
−∞
= − − −∫         5 
where ( )1f q R in equation 5 is the third order posterior distribution function. The 
optimal solution is 
^
1 2
2 2
D q cq − −= and
( ) 22 1 1
2 1
1
~ ,
2 4
D c q q
q q N
θ θ θ
κ
−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
− − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
Foreseeing that firm 1 therefore solves  
( ) ( )
1
^
2 1
1 1 1 1max 2 2q
qD cE D q c q f dπ ε ε
∞
−∞
⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟= − − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫       6  
The optimal solution is ( )( )
2 11
1
1 2
2 2
D c q c
q
θ
θ
−
+ + − −
=
−
. Therefore, the fourth order prior 
conjecture is 1 1~ ,q N q ρ
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , 
2 1
1
2
3
D c cq
θ
−
− + −
=
−
 and ( )2
1
2
ρ ζ
θ
=
−
. At this point, the 
conjectures converge. 
  
At the Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures, firm 2 produces 
( ) ( )1 1
2
2
1
2 2
q q
D cq
θ ε θ
−⎛ ⎞+ + −⎜ ⎟
− ⎝ ⎠
= −          7 
Firm 1 produces 
2
1 1 1
1 1
3 2 3
D cq c cθ
θ θ θ
−+ −⎛ ⎞
= − +⎜ ⎟
− − −⎝ ⎠           8 
 
2.2. Perfect and Complete Information and Indeterminacy. 
 Now let
0
lim lim 0
ρ κ
θ
→ →∞
= . In this case, at BEIC, 
( )
( )
2 11 2 1
1
1 2 2
2 2 3
D c q c D c cq
θ
θ
−
+ + − − + −
= =
−
        9 
( ) ( )1 1
2 2 1
2
1
2
2 2 3
q q
D c D c cq
θ ε θ
−⎛ ⎞+ + −⎜ ⎟
− − +⎝ ⎠
= − =       10 
This is the Cournot solution for the complete and imperfect information game or 
simultaneous game. 
 
Now let the variance of the type distribution function ( )ζ  and variance of the noise 
term ( )κ  both tend to zero. The variance of the prior conjectural distribution 
function on 1q  therefore tends to zero as well. The equilibrium 1q  and 2q  when all 
the three variances tend to zero depend upon the value of 
0 0
lim lim
ρ κ
θ
→ →
 which could take 
on any value from 0 to 1. If 
0 0
lim lim 0
ρ κ
θ
→ →
= , then the BEIC has the Cournot solution. 
When 
0 0
lim lim 1
ρ κ
θ
→ →
= , then the BEIC has the Stackelberg solution. 5  That is, 
( )
( )
( )
( )
2 1 2 1 11 2 1
1
1 2 1 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
D c q c D c q c D c cq
θ θ
θ θ
−
+ + − − + + − − + −
= = =
− −
   11 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 12 2
2
2 1 2 1
1 1
2 2 2 2
3 2
2 4
q q q qD c D cq
D c q D c c
θ ε θ θ ε θ
−⎛ ⎞+ + −⎜ ⎟ + + −
− −⎝ ⎠
= − = −
− − − +
= =
  12 
 
If
0 0
lim lim 0.5
ρ κ
θ
→ →
= , then in the BEIC,  
                                                 
5 This case assumes that the inferring agent bases his statistical inference and decision entirely on his 
observation and not prior conjecturing. 
( )
( )
( )2 1 2 11
1
1 2 2 2
2 2 5
D c q c D c c
q
θ
θ
−
+ + − − + −
= =
−
       13 
( ) ( )1 1
2
2 2 1
1
2 7 2
2 2 5 10 5
q q
D cq D c c
θ ε θ
−⎛ ⎞+ + −⎜ ⎟
− ⎝ ⎠
= − = − +      14 
 
The cases are illustrated in the diagram below: 
 
In the above diagram, C is the solution when 0θ = , S is the solution when 1θ =  and 
G is the solution when 0.5θ = . This indeterminacy arises for given perfect 
information and complete information, it begs the question: which is more accurate, 
the information on action that is perfect or the information on type that is complete. 
 
3. Sequential Games with Incomplete but Perfect Information 
 
In current Nash Equilibrium based games theory, the solution algorithm of sequential 
games with incomplete and perfect information solves a game by asking which 
combinations of strategies and posterior beliefs of players constitute equilibriums. 
Implicit in this solution algorithm is the assumption that the players know which 
equilibrium they are in and knows the equilibrium strategies and beliefs of the other 
players. The assumption that players know the equilibrium of the game and strategies 
and beliefs of the other player removes much of the inherent uncertainty about the 
strategies of the other players in games of incomplete information. 
 
In a sequential game of incomplete and perfect information, there is the uncertainty 
about the type of some of the players. Therefore, despite the fact that the player 
observes the action of the player with unknown type perfectly, he must still infer 
about the strategy of each type of the player with unknown type through game 
theoretic reasoning. Also, the player with unknown type must also conjecture about 
the strategy and conjectures of the other player when selecting his strategy. 
Consequently, unlike a sequential game of complete and perfect information, the 
player cannot condition his strategy upon the other player's strategy: the player with 
known type cannot do so for the other player has more than one types and the player 
with known type observes the other player’s action but not strategy and, the player 
with unknown type cannot do so for he must infer about the conjectures or beliefs 
(which he does not observe) and strategies (which depends upon the conjectures) of 
the other player. 
 
The BEIC approach, in contrast, investigates how the conjectures of players about the 
strategies of the other players and their conjectures converge. The solution algorithm 
is exactly the same as that of the previous section, except that in this case the players 
make perfect observation of action (perfect information) and hence have no need to 
make statistical inference on action but must make statistical inference and decision 
on the strategies and types of other players. 
 
In solving sequential games with incomplete and perfect information, the BEIC 
approach starts from the assumption that players do not know the other player's 
strategy nor the equilibrium of the game through the use of first order uninformative 
conjectures, though the players observe perfectly the action of other players. 
Conjectures are updated using game theoretic reasoning until a convergence emerges 
which then defines a BEIC. Another important difference between the BEIC approach 
and the current games theory is that when having pooling equilibrium, the current 
games theory needs to specify probability beliefs on off equilibrium paths. In contrast, 
the BEIC approach uses a hierarchy of conjectures, first order uninformative prior 
conjectures and higher order conjectures, the highest order conjectures being the set 
of convergent conjectures (if it exists). The convergent conjectures and their 
corresponding equilibrium, either separating or pooling equilibrium, are supported by 
lower level conjectures. Therefore, there is no need to specify off equilibrium paths 
beliefs. 
 
3.1. Example 2: Coordination Game. 
 
Consider the signaling game as depicted in the following diagram. 
 
The probability of player 1 being type 1 and type 2 is r and 1-r.  
   
There are four perfect Bayesian equilibriums: 
i. (L, R; u(L), d(R)). This equilibrium is socially suboptimal. 
ii. (R, L; d(L), u(R)). This equilibrium is socially optimal. 
iii. Pooling equilibrium (R, R; u(L), u(R); r>1/6, p>5/6). 
iv. Pooling equilibrium (L, L; d(L), d(R); r<5/6, q<1/6). 
The two pooling equilibriums are ruled out by the intuitive criterion. The separating 
equilibriums do not change as r changes. 
  
Solving by the BEIC approach: 
  
Let the probability that the receiver plays U when observed L be a and the probability 
that the receiver plays U when observed R be b. Let the probability that the type 1 
sender plays L be x and the probability that the type 2 sender plays L be y. 
 
Type 1 sender plays L if ( )2 1 5a a b+ − >  or 1
5 5
a b+ > . 
Type 2 sender plays L if ( ) ( )5 1 2 1a b b− > + −  or 3
5 5
b a+ > . 
When L is observed, the receiver plays U if ( )2 5 1xr xr y r> + −  or ( )5 1xr y r> − . 
When R is observed, the receiver plays U if ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )5 1 1 1 2 1 1x r y r y r− + − − > − −  
or ( ) ( )( )5 1 1 1x r y r− > − − . 
 
When r<1/6, given the first order conjectures that x=1/2 and y=1/2, the receiver plays 
D when L is observed and D when R is observed. Anticipating that, type 1 sender 
plays L and type 2 sender plays L. The receiver updates his conjectures to x=1 and 
y=1 and plays D(L). Anticipating that, type 1 sender plays L and type 2 sender plays L. 
The conjectures converge here. The BEIC is (L, L; D(L), D(R)). 
 
When r=1/6, given the first order conjectures that x=1/2 and y=1/2, the receiver plays 
D when L is observed and is indifferent between U and D when R is observed. 
Anticipating that, type 1 sender plays R and type 2 sender plays L. The receiver 
updates his conjectures to x=0 and y=1 and plays D(L) and U(R). Anticipating that, 
type 1 sender plays R and type 2 sender plays L. At this point the conjectures 
converge. The BEIC is (R, L; D(L), U(R)). 
 
When 1/6<r<5/6, given the first order conjectures that x=1/2 and y=1/2, the receiver 
plays D when L is observed and U when R is observed. Anticipating that, type 1 
sender plays R and type 2 sender plays L. The receiver updates his conjectures to x=0 
and y=1 and plays D(L) and U(R). Anticipating that, type 1 sender plays R and type 2 
sender plays L. The conjectures converge here. The BEIC is (R, L; D(L), U(R)). 
 
When r=5/6, given the first order conjectures that x=1/2 and y=1/2, the receiver is 
indifferent between U and D when L is observed and plays U when R is observed. 
Anticipating that, type 1 sender plays R and type 2 sender plays L. The receiver 
updates his conjectures to x=0 and y=1 and plays D(L) and U(R). Anticipating that, 
type 1 sender plays R and type 2 sender plays L. The conjectures converge at this 
point. The BEIC is (R, L; D(L), U(R)). 
 
When r>5/6, given the first order conjectures that x=1/2 and y=1/2, the receiver plays 
U when L is observed and U when R is observed. Anticipating that, type 1 sender 
plays R and type 2 sender plays R. The receiver updates his conjectures to x=0 and 
y=0 and plays U(R). The conjectures converge here. The BEIC is (R, L; D(L), U(R)). 
 
By the BEIC approach, the selection of equilibriums depends on the value of r. In 
contrast, the PBE approach has separating equilibriums that have nothing to do with r. 
The two extreme cases of r approaches one and r approaches zero helps to shed light 
on this distinction between the two approaches. When r approaches one, the BEIC is 
(R, R; U(L), U(R)). It is equilibrium iii of the PBE approach which is ruled out by the 
intuitive criterion. Note that the BEIC for this limiting case agrees with the 
equilibrium for the sequential complete and perfect information game which is 
represented by the diagram below: 
  
 
The equilibrium is (R; u(L), u(R)) which is derived through backward induction. 
 
When r approaches zero, the BEIC is (L, L; D(L), D(R)). It is equilibrium iv of the 
PBE approach which is ruled out by the intuitive criterion. Note that the BEIC for this 
limiting case agrees with the equilibrium for the sequential complete and perfect 
information game which is represented by the diagram below: 
 
The equilibrium is (L; d(L), d(R)) which is derived through backward induction. 
 
The above example illustrates the BEIC approach to solving a game of incomplete 
and perfect information. It also illuminates the relationship between incomplete and 
perfect information sequential games and complete and perfect information sequential 
games. When the variance of type tends to zero, a sequential game with incomplete 
and perfect information becomes a sequential game with complete and perfect 
information where the player relies upon the observation totally for his statistical 
inference and decision and not the prior conjectures. The equilibrium of the latter 
should equal to the equilibrium of the former in the limiting case. The BEIC approach 
satisfies this requirement. 
 
4. Simultaneous Games 
 
The way the Nash equilibrium approach solves a simultaneous move game is to get 
the interaction points of the reaction functions. Implicit in this solution algorithm is 
that there is perfect information and the moves are sequential. That is what a reaction 
function means: the reaction of one player to the action of the other player. That 
implies perfect information for you must observe the action of the other party before 
you could react to his action. If there is simultaneity in moves and the players do not 
observe the moves of the other players, then they could not react to the actions of the 
other players. In this situation, a player would react to his conjectures of the actions of 
the other players. It is clear that conjecture plays a central role here. The reaction 
functions of a simultaneous game are therefore not really reaction functions as those 
of a perfect information sequential game and are best named as virtual reaction 
functions for differentiation from the real reaction functions of a perfect information 
sequential game. 
 
In a simultaneous move game, none of the players observed what the other players are 
doing and they all make their decisions simultaneously and all these are common 
knowledge. By the very definition of simultaneous move, even if one of players will 
play a particular equilibrium strategy prescribed by the concept of Nash equilibrium, 
the other players still do not observe the action of that player. They therefore have to 
conjecture about the move. Since what the players think or conjecture will affect their 
decisions, it therefore follows that the players must conjecture about the other player' 
conjectures, besides conjecturing what the other players are doing or will do. 
 
The BEIC solution of a simultaneous game traces out the whole process of formation 
and updating of conjectures starting with first order uninformative conjectures and 
keep updating by game theoretic reasoning to achieve convergence in conjectures, if 
there is any. Example 4 and 5 illustrate the BEIC solution of complete and incomplete 
information simultaneous games. 
 
Example 4: Investment Entry Game 
1\2 Enter (y) Refrain (1-y) 
Modern (w) 0, -2 7, 0 
Antique (1-w) 4, 2 6, 0 
 
There are three Nash equilibriums: (w=0, y=1), (w=1, y=0) and (w=1/2, y=1/5). 
The reaction functions are: w=1 for y<1/5, [ ]0,1w∈  for y=1/5 and w=0 for y>1/5; 
y=1 for w<1/2, [ ]0,1y∈  for w=1/2, y=0 for w>1/2. 
 
The BEIC solution proceeds as follow: 
 
Given the first order uninformative conjectures that 0.5w = , the second order 
conjecture is y=0.5 as the second player is indifferent between Enter and Refrain 
given that w=0.5. The third order conjecture is w=0 and the fourth order conjecture is 
y=1 and the fifth order conjecture is w=0 and the conjectures converge here. Starting 
with the first order conjecture that 0.5y = , the second order conjecture is 0w =  and 
the third and fourth order conjectures are y=1 and 0w = . The process converges here. 
The unique BEIC is (w=0, y=1). 
 
The BEIC of a simultaneous game is very similar to the focal point. Both are 
convergence of conjectures (or predictions or expectations). 6  This similarity is 
obvious by looking at the best-response equivalent identical interest game of the 
entry-investment game analyzed above. A best-response equivalent game is a 
transformation of a game whereby the payoff matrix of the original game is 
transformed yet the reaction functions are preserved so that the strategic nature of the 
game is unchanged.7 An identical interest game has the special feature that the 
payoffs of the players are exactly the same. In an identical interest game, there is 
therefore at least a natural focal point or Schelling point: the combination of strategies 
that yields the highest payoff.  
 
The best response equivalent identical interest game of the investment-entry game is: 
 
1\2 Enter (y) Refrain (1-y) 
Modern (w) 0, 0 5, 5 
Antique (1-w) 8, 8 3, 3 
 
Note that (0,1) is both the BRPE and focal point. 
 
Since the BEIC is a point where conjectures converged, the BEIC approach therefore 
selects compelling stable equilibrium and eliminates unstable equilibrium. As mixed 
strategy equilibriums are in general unstable, they are generally eliminated in the 
selection of BEIC.8 
 
The BEIC approach also has the merit that its solution agrees with that of selection of 
equilibrium by iterative elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies (if that could be 
done). The following game is an example. 
  
 
 
                                                 
6 Schelling (1960, p. 57): ''focal point(s) for each person's expectation of what the other expects him to 
expect to be expected to do.'' 
7 Refer to Morris and Takashi (2004). 
8 Refer to Aumann (1985) for criticisms of mixed strategy equilibrium. 
1\2 L (y) R (1-y) 
U (x) 0, 1 1, 1 
D (1-x) 1, 1 1, 0 
 
There are two Nash equilibriums: (D, L) and (U, R). However, only one of them (D, L) 
makes sense for (U, R) would be weeded out by the elimination of (weakly) 
dominated strategy. 
 
The BEIC solution proceeds as follow: Given the first order uninformative conjecture 
that 0.5x = , the second order conjecture is 1y =  and the third order conjecture 
is 0x = and the process converges here. Given the first order uninformative conjecture 
that 0.5y = , the second order conjecture is 0x = and the third order conjecture is 
1y = and the process converges here. The unique BEIC is (x=0, y=1) and it agrees 
with the result from iterative elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies. 
 
Example 5: Incomplete Information Investment Entry Game 
 
The solution of incomplete information simultaneous game proceeds in likewise 
manner, as shown in the following example where firm 2 has two types, high cost 
type with probability 1/10 and low cost type with probability 9/10. There are multiple 
equilibriums by the Bayesian Nash equilibrium approach. The BEIC approach yields 
a unique equilibrium. 
 
When facing the high cost firm 2, firm 1 has the following payoff matrix: 
1\2 Enter (z) Refrain (1-z) 
Modern (w) 0, -5 7, 0 
Antique (1-w) 4, 1 6, 0 
 
Firm 1 when facing the low cost firm 2 has the following payoff matrix: 
1\2 Enter (y) Refrain (1-y) 
Modern (w) 0, -2 7, 0 
Antique (1-w) 4, 2 6, 0 
  
The reaction functions are: 
I. [ ]9 1 9 1 9 11 if 1 , 0,1  if 1  and 0 if 1 .
2 2 2 2 2 2
w y z w y z w y z= > + ∈ = + = < +  
II. [ ]1 1 11 if , 0,1  if  and 0 if 
2 2 2
y w y w y w= > ∈ = = <  
III. [ ]1 1 11 if , 0,1  if  and 0 if 
6 6 6
z w z w z w= > ∈ = = <  
 
Starting with w=0.5, the second order conjectures are y=0.5 and z=0. The third, fourth 
and fifth order conjectures are w=0, y=1 and z=1 and, w=0. Here the conjectures 
converge. Starting with y=0.5 and z=0.5, the second order conjecture is w=0. The 
third and fourth order conjectures are y=1, z=1 and w=0. Here the conjectures 
converge. The unique BEIC is w=0, y=1 and z=1. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Given its ability to narrow down the number of equilibrium normally to one, the 
BEIC approach is useful for solving games with multiple side incomplete information, 
multiple heterogeneous players and multiple decision variables. It would also be 
useful for analyzing games where expectations or predictions need to be endogenous, 
such as macroeconomics games involving rational expectation. 
 
Finally, I highlight a few major differences between the BEIC approach and the 
current Nash Equilibrium based approach: 
 
1. Consistency with other major solution concepts. 
The equilibrium results of current Nash Equilibrium games theory sometimes 
contradict those derived by backward induction or iterative elimination of (weakly) 
dominated strategies. In contrast, the BEIC results are consistent with those of these 
two methods. 
 
2. Use of reaction functions. 
The current prevailing Nash Equilibrium games theory solves for equilibriums by 
constructing reaction functions and looks for their intersections. In contrast, the BEIC 
approach constructs reaction functions as well. It however uses first order 
uninformative conjectures and reaction functions to derive higher and higher orders of 
conjectures until a convergence of conjectures is achieved.  
 
3. Definition of rationality. 
The Nash Equilibrium based approach starts without defining rationality in the 
processing of information and forming of conjectures or prediction. It incorporates 
rationality in the processing of information and forming of predictions in an ad hoc 
manner latter through Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and its many refinements. In 
contrast, rationality in the processing of information and forming of predictions is the 
very foundation of the BEIC. 
4. Equilibrium in Strategic Space versus Equilibrium in Subjective Probability Space 
The Nash equilibrium approach defines equilibrium in the strategic/actions space. The 
incorporation of beliefs in incomplete information games does not change that basic 
feature. In contrast, the BEIC approach defines equilibrium in the subjective 
probability space with its use of convergence of conjectures. Of course, for 
conjectures to converge, they must also be consistent with the equilibrium they 
supported and so the BEIC’s equilibrium in subjective probability space naturally 
incorporates equilibrium in strategic/action space as well. 
 
5. Objective Versus Subjective Probability distribution function 
The BEIC is based on the Bayesian view of subjective probability. This allows the 
tracing of updating of conjectures from first order uninformative conjectures to higher 
and higher order of conjectures and till convergence. The Nash equilibrium based 
approach largely sticks to the classical or frequentist view of probability. 9  In 
sequential games of incomplete information with pooling equilibriums, the use of off 
equilibrium beliefs is an exception that resort to subjective probability.  
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